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Cuba's Quarantine of AIDS Victims: A 
Violation of Human Rights? 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1987, the Cuban regime became the first government in the 
world to implement a strict quarantine for all individuals infected 
with the Human Immuno-deficiency Virus (HIV).! To detect 
carriers of the virus, a precursor to Acquired Immuno-deficiency 
Syndrome (AIDS), Cuba instituted a national mandatory testing 
program.2 The program required infected individuals to move 
to a former sanitarium outside of Havana for an indefinite period 
oftime.3 Contrary to the recommendations of the United Nations 
World Health Organization (WHO),4 the policy continues today.5 
The implementation of the quarantine policy raises a number 
of human rights issues. Foremost among them is the concern that 
the detention is arbitrary.6 Most international scholars agree that 
an arbitrary detention constitutes a violation of international hu-
man rights law. Whether a particular detention is arbitrary, how-
ever, may be open to debate. 7 Some scholars, for example, believe 
education alone can halt the spread of AIDS. 8 Thus, a quarantine 
1 Joseph B. Treaster, Havana Reports 3 Cubans Dead of AIDS and Sets Up Isolation Unit, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1987, at A2. 
2 See infra text accompanying notes 97-107. 
3 See infra text accompanying notes 108-23. 
4 The World Health Organization (WHO) is a specialized agency of the United Nations 
with primary responsibility for international public health matters. See generally WORLD 
HEALTH ORGANIZATION, BASIC DOCUMENTS (1990). Created in 1948, 166 countries, in-
cluding Cuba, are now WHO members. The objective of WHO is stated in article I of its 
Constitution as "the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health." Id. 
at 2. 
5 See infra text accompanying notes 73-74; Jonathan M. Mann et al., Global Coordination 
of National Public Health Strategies, 18 LAW, MED. & HEALTH 20, 22 (1990); WORLD HEALTH 
ORGANIZATION, GUIDELINE FOR NURSING MANAGEMENT OF PEOPLE INFECTED WITH HUMAN 
IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS (HIV) 41 (1988) [hereinafter GUIDELINES FOR NURSING]. 
6 See infra text accompanying notes 66-68. See also Ernesto F. Betancourt, Cuba's Callous 
War on AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1988, at B2; M.D. Kirby, AIDS Strategies and Human 
Rights Obligations, 42 INT'L COMMISSION OF JURISTS REV. 42, 49 (1989). 
7 See infra notes 35, 92 and accompanying text. 
S See infra text accompanying notes 75-76. 
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policy would be a disproportionate response to the AIDS threat 
and, therefore, arbitrary.9 Others suggest that the international 
community must examine any policy designed to combat AIDS 
in light of a country's particular demographic, economic, political, 
and cultural composition before passing judgment. 10 
This Comment attempts to determine whether Cuba's quar-
antine program violates international human rights law. In order 
to establish that a body of international law exists upon which 
critics of the quarantine can base their claim, Part I provides an 
overview of the sources and development of internationally rec-
ognized human rights. Part II discusses the international re-
sponse to AIDS and the impact of that response on the devel-
opment and scope of human rights law as it applies to AIDS 
victims. Part III describes the Cuban quarantine policy, while 
Part IV analyzes the policy-and criticisms of it-in light of those 
political, social, and economic factors that are unique to Cuba. 
This Comment concludes that, considering the nature of the 
policy and Cuban society in general, its quarantine does not vio-
late international human rights law. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT AND SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW: AN OVERVIEW 
A. The Development of Human Rights Law 
The idea that there exist certain immutable human rights which 
transcend national boundaries, and which all states must respect, 
is a relatively new phenomenon within the international com-
munity.ll Prior to discovery of the Nazi atrocities inflicted upon 
millions of people, the only rights afforded individuals were those 
their national governments provided. 12 Documents such as the 
Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, and the Charter of Privileges 
9 See Kirby, supra note 6, at 50. Kirby argues: "The derogation from the human rights 
of persons compulsorily detained because of HIV infection is completely disproportional 
to the benefits secured thereby." Id. 
10 See, e.g., Maria Paalman, Epidemic Control Through Prevention, in THE GLOBAL IMPACT 
OF AIDS 215, 216-17 (Alan F. Fleming et al. eds., 1988); infra notes 87-88 and accom-
panying text. 
11 See Richard B. Bilder, The Status of International Human Rights Law; An Overview, in 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE I, 1 (1978). 
12 See id.; A.M. Stuyt, Human Rights Sources-An Outline, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS 
SOURCES 165, 165 (Wybo P. Heere ed., 1988). 
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address the rights of citizens living within a society as distinct 
from the rights of individuals as human beings. 13 Protecting the 
rights of individuals was not a traditional function of international 
law. 14 
The limited international concern for individuals which existed 
prior to the Second World War found expression in various 
treaties between states banning slavery and protecting certain 
ethnic minorities. 15 The individual, however, only found protec-
tion as a member of a group and exclusively through the estab-
lishment of treaties between states. 16 With the creation of the 
United Nations came the articulation of a principle upon which 
individuals could assert rights. 17 That principle, contained within 
the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations (U. N. Charter 
or Charter), is that respect for the "human dignity" of individuals 
must be maintained by all states. IS This essentially means that 
individuals no longer need rely on treaties between states to assert 
a right-the simple fact that they are human beings grants them 
that privilege. 19 
International human rights law is not as developed and coher-
ent as other areas of international law, but it has "clearly reached 
a stage where it deserves and has received recognition as a spe-
cialized field of its own."20 The number of specialized organiza-
tions, conferences, journals, academic literature, and courses de-
voted to furthering and defining international human rights law 
provides ample evidence of its legitimate standing in the wider 
sphere of internationallaw.21 
13 See Stuyt, supra note 12, at 165. 
14 See Bilder, supra note 11, at 1. 
15 Id. Governments used treaties to protect Jews in Russia, and Armenians in the 
Turkish empire, as well as to ban slavery. See, e.g., International Convention to Suppress 
Slave Trade and Slavery, Sept. 25, 1926,46 Stat. 2183, 60 L.N.T.S. 253. 
16 See Bilder, supra note 11, at 1. 
17 See U.N. CHARTER pmbl. 
18 Id. The preamble states in part that one of the aims of the United Nations is "to 
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity of worth of the human person 
.... " Id. For a partial list of subsequent important documents which reaffirm the principle 
of inherent human dignity, see Stuyt, supra note 12, at 169. 
19 See Stuyt, supra note 12, at 168-69. For a discussion of methods by which individuals 
may attempt to remedy an abuse of their rights, see generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 703 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATE-
MENT]. 
20 Bilder, supra note 11, at 3. 
21 Id. 
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B. The Sources of Human Rights Law 
International law is derived from three principal sources: in-
ternational treaties, international custom, and the general prin-
ciples of law recognized by "civilized nations."22 Judicial decisions 
and the treatises of the most qualified scholars serve as secondary 
sources.23 Because the scope of international human rights is still 
evolving, various human rights treaties, declarations, and instru-
ments provide the most useful means for determining the extent 
of those rights. 24 
1. Treaties 
The substantial number of human rights treaties currently in 
force, when viewed together, place a significant number of legal 
obligations upon states.25 The most important treaty, to which 
most states are parties, is the U.N. Charter.26 Nevertheless, while 
the Charter is legally binding on all U.N. members, its human 
rights provisions are too broad for use in defining the scope of 
those rights. 27 There are two conventions in force, however, 
which enlarge into detailed treaty form not only the skeletal 
human rights provisions of the Charter, but many provisions of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declara-
tion).28 These conventions are the International Covenant on 
22 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, Oct. 24, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 
T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter I.C.]. Statute]. See also JOHN HUMPHREY, No DISTANT MILLEN-
NIUM: THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 156 (1989). 
23 See I.C.]. Statute, supra note 22, at art. 38. 
24 See Bilder, supra note II, at 4. It is not practical to examine in detail the full range 
of international human rights rules, procedures, and precedents that may affect the Cuban 
quarantine policy. Instead, it is more useful to focus on those instruments used by 
opponents of the policy to substantiate their contention that quarantine is a violation of 
international human rights. 
25 See id. at 4,7. For a listing of U.N. human rights treaties in force see RESTATEMENT, 
supra note 19, at Part VII Introductory Note. 
26 See Bilder, supra note II, at 7. 
27 See U.N. CHARTER art. 55(c). Article 55(c) of the U.N. Charter contains its most 
explicit reference to human rights, stating that "the United Nations shall promote ... 
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for 
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." [d. 
28 See JOSEPH M. SWEENEY ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 632 (3d ed. 1988). 
See also infra text accompanying notes 42-45. 
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Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights29 and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Covenants).30 
The importance of the Covenants in regard to Cuba's quar-
antine policy rests in the assertion that they are binding on Cuba 
even though it is not a signatory.31 According to some commen-
tators, the provisions of the Covenants represent international 
customary law.32 This argument, however, is subject to debate. 
The Covenants became effective in 1976, and approximately 
ninety nations have ratified them.33 Portions of the Covenants, 
such as provisions banning slavery, torture, and systematic racial 
discrimination, represent international customary law and are, 
therefore, binding on all states regardless of whether they signed 
the Convention. 34 The international community, however, rec-
ognized these compelling provisions as customary law prior to, 
and not as a result of, ratification of the Covenants.35 Less com-
29 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 
Dec. 19, 1966,993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
'0 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 
1966,999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force, Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
" See Kirby, supra note 6, at 48. 
32 [d. Kirby states: "For all countries, whether they have ratified these international 
instruments or not, the International Covenants ... provide statements of rules which 
are legally binding because they are now part of international law." [d. 
" See RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, at Part VII Introductory Note. 
84 See B. G. RAMCHARAN, THE CONCEPT AND PRESENT STATUS OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 59 (1987). See also HUMPHREY, supra note 22, at 156. There 
is little agreement regarding the meaning or character of custom in international law. 
Nevertheless, a precise definition of the concept is not necessary in the context of this 
Comment. Any references to standards of conduct as customary international law are 
made only when those standards have been widely recognized as such. See, e.g., infra note 
35 and accompanying text. 
85 See LOUIS B. SOHN & THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS 518-19 (1973). The international community recognized such provisions as part 
of customary international law following the adoption of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. [d. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, at § 702. The American Law 
Institute takes the position that there are certain fundamental human rights that are now 
part of customary international law. A violation occurs if a state practices, encourages, or 
condones (a) genocide; (b) slavery or slave trade; (c) the murder or causing disappearance 
of individuals; (d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punish-
ment; (e) prolonged arbitrary detention; (f) systematic racial discrimination; or (g) a 
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights. 
The customary international law of human rights creates obligations by each state for 
all other states. Thus, every state may, in principle, pursue remedies against any other 
state that violates the human rights of those individuals subject to its jurisdiction. In 
practice, however, states will usually attempt to vindicate only those wrongs committed 
against individuals in whom the vindicating state has a special interest-that is, their own 
nationals. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, at § 701. 
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pelling provisions of the Covenants, which quarantine critics use 
to attack the policy, include the "right to gain a living by work 
freely chosen."36 The status of such provisions is widely debated, 
but it may be premature to claim that they constitute customary 
international law.3' At most, they represent an ideal which non-
signatories should consider when formulating national policies.38 
2. Declarations 
Along with international treaties, there exist a large number of 
international declarations that the United Nations or other inter-
national organizations have adopted.39 While not drafted in bind-
ing language, these declarations contribute to the establishment 
of minimal standards of conduct for all peoples and all nations.40 
Human rights activists often invoke various provisions of these 
declarations as expressions of international law.41 This is espe-
cially true of the Universal Declaration, which the U.N. General 
Assembly adopted in 1948.42 
While the drafters of the Universal Declaration expressly de-
nied that it represented a binding international document, it 
eventually acquired a moral and political authority equal to that 
of the Charter.43 Not only has the Universal Declaration inspired 
a large number of international conventions, but it is reflected in 
national constitutions, legislation, and in the decisions of national 
36 Kirby, supra note 6, at 51; ICESCR, supra note 29, at art. 6(1). 
37 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, at § 702 cmt. a. The American Law Institute does 
not include the "right to gain a living by work freely chosen" among those rights consid-
ered part of customary international law. 
38 See RAMCHARAN, supra note 34, at 59. Ramcharan states: "The International Cove-
nants are, in principle, legally binding only upon the States which have expressly ratified 
or acceded to them except to the extent that some provisions of the Covenants might 
represent international customary law." Id. 
39 See Bilder, supra note II, at 5. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, at § 701; PAUL SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 53-55 (1983); Robert M. Jarvis, Advocacy for AIDS Victims: An 
International Law Approach, 20 INTER-AM. L. REV. 1,9-11 (1988). See also infra note 42 
and accompanying text. 
42 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 
(1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]. Sieghart asserts: "Between 1958 and 1972, 
references to [the Universal Declaration] were included in 25 new national constitutions 
and 8 domestic legislative acts." SIEGHART, supra note 41, at 53 n.9. 
43 HUMPHREY, supra note 22, at 154. 
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and international tribunals.44 Contrary to the drafters' stated in-
tentions, many of the Declaration's provisions are now part of 
customary internationallaw.45 
3. Decisions, Resolutions, and Recommendations 
Another category of instruments which contribute to the body 
of international human rights law are those decisions, resolu-
tions,46 and recommendations generated by various U.N. organs 
or international agencies that deal with human rights problemsY 
There are essentially three points of view regarding the impact 
of resolutions on international law: a resolution's provisions (1) 
are legally binding on states; (2) possess only political and moral 
significance; or (3) contain a legal element, but are not legally 
binding.48 
The most widely accepted position is that resolutions have only 
political and moral force. 49 To the extent that a single resolution 
has any bearing on international law, it is that it gives a state the 
right to act in ways consistent with that resolution. 50 Actions states 
take in accordance with such resolutions, therefore, cannot be 
legally challenged.51 
While a single resolution may be relatively insignificant, some 
commentators believe that several identical resolutions can, taken 
as a whole, provide evidence of customary law. 52 However, 
"[r]esolutions, as a rule, do not result from state practice; they 
are recommendations for the future."53 The resolutions become 
44 See id. at 155. 
45 Id.; SIEGHART. supra note 41, at 54-55. 
46 The U.N. General Assembly's adoption of a resolution concerning AIDS makes 
resolutions-as opposed to decisions and recommendations-particularly relevant. See 
infra text accompanying notes 78-80. 
47 See Bilder, supra note 11, at 5. For a detailed discussion of the impact of resolutions 
and recommendations on international law, see generally G.1. Tunkin, The Role of Reso-
lutions of International Organisations in Creating Norms of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 5 (W. E. Butler ed., 1987); Ingrid Delupis, The 
Legal Value of Recommendations of International Organisations, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 47 (W. E. Butler ed., 1987). 
48 See Tunkin, supra note 47, at 5. 
49 See id. at 7. 
50 Id. at 8. 
51 Id. 
52 See Delupis, supra note 47, at 47. 
53 Tunkin, supra note 47, at 13. 
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binding only when, in the course of practice, states gradually 
recognize them as binding.54 
II. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO AIDS 
A. The u.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration, the Covenants, and 
AIDS 
Some opponents of AIDS quarantine programs like Cuba's 
support their contention that the policy violates international 
human rights law by citing various articles of the U.N. Charter, 
the Universal Declaration, and the Covenants.55 The Charter's 
human rights provisions, however, are too broad to add signifi-
cant weight to anti-quarantine arguments. Thus, critics rely 
chiefly on the Universal Declaration and the Covenants. 56 
The most important articles of the Universal Declaration used 
to support claims of human rights violations address the right to 
freedom of movement,57 the right to be free from arbitrary de-
tention,58 the right to privacy,59 and the right to marry.5O Because 
these "rights" are contained within the Universal Declaration, it 
is possible to argue that they have obtained the force of customary 
international law.61 With the exception of the right to be free 
from arbitrary detention, however, they merit only a brief ex-
amination where quarantine is concerned.62 
54 [d. at 14. 
55 See, e.g., Kirby, supra note 6, at 48-51; Jarvis, supra note 41, at 8-13. 
56 For a discussion of quarantine critics' use of the Covenant, see supra text accom-
panying notes 29-38. 
57 See Universal Declaration, supra note 42, at art. 13. Article 13 states: "(1) Everyone 
has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State. 
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his 
country." [d. But see ICCPR, supra note 30, at art. 12(3). Article 12(3) provides a number 
of exceptions permitting restrictions, including restrictions to protect public health. 
58 See infra text accompanying note 66. 
59 See Universal Declaration, supra note 42, at art. 12. Article 12 states: "No one shall 
be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence 
60 See id. at art. 16 ("Men and women of full age ... have the right to marry and to 
found a family."). 
61 See SIEGHART, supra note 41, at 54; supra text accompanying note 57. 
62 The rights to privacy and marriage do not belong to that category of rights that are 
never subject to derogation. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, at § 702, note 11. The 
Universal Declaration states that rights may be limited by law for purposes of meeting 
"the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare ... " of the state. 
Universal Declaration, supra note 42, at art. 29(2). Infringement on the rights to privacy 
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The right to freedom of movement is set forth in article 13 of 
the Universal Declaration.63 Opponents of quarantine policies 
argue that this gives AIDS victims the right to leave a country to 
avoid detention.64 While this argument bears some merit, it is less 
compelling in a country such as Cuba where no one is afforded 
freedom of movement.65 Restrictions on the freedom of move-
ment out of the country have no special applicability to AIDS 
patients. Such policies are essentially unrelated to the AIDS quar-
antine, and therefore are beyond the scope of this Comment's 
analysis. 
Article 9 of the Universal Declaration states: "[n]o one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile."66 Most scholars 
agree that this article represents customary internationallaw.67 If 
the quarantine policy is arbitrary, it would, therefore, constitute 
a human rights violation. On the other hand, if the detention is 
not arbitrary, the policy is legitimate, and there is no need to 
examine the claims of a right to privacy or a right to marry. 
These individual rights may be restricted for legitimate reasons.68 
The dispositive question, then, is whether the AIDS quarantine 
is an arbitrary detention. 
B. WHO's View of Quarantine Policies 
In 1985, as the global scope of the AIDS crisis became appar-
ent, WHO drafted a global strategy for the prevention and con-
trol of AIDS.69 Its objectives are threefold: "(a) to prevent HIV 
and marriage, then, would be acceptable for maintaining public health if it represents 
the only means to do so. 
Quarantine critics might also argue that it constitutes cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
treatment, a more serious violation of international human rights law. See supra note 35 
and accompanying text. Critics could not persuasively argue that the policy is, by defini-
tion, cruel or degrading if it is not arbitrary, or, stated positively, if it is legitimate. A 
stronger argument would focus on the way the interned are treated. Even such an 
approach, however, would probably not reveal a violation of human rights law given 
Cuba's apparent effort to treat the interned humanely. See infra text accompanying notes 
114-18. For a discussion of what constitutes cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, 
see generally Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) at 25 (1978). 
63 See supra text accompanying note 57. 
64 See, e.g., Jarvis, supra note 41, at 10; Kirby, supra note 6, at 50-51. 
65 See HUGH S. THOMAS ET AL., THE CUBAN REVOLUTION 50 (1984). 
66 Universal Declaration, supra note 42, at art. 9. 
67 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, at § 702. 
68 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
69 See World Health Organization, Fortieth World Health Assembly, Geneva, 4-15 May 
1987, Resolution and Decisions, Annexes (WHAAO/1987IREC/I); Mann et aI., supra note 5, 
at 20. 
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infection; (b) to reduce the personal and social impact of HIV/ 
AIDS; and (c) to unify national and international efforts against 
AIDS."70 A number of guidelines determine the manner in which 
states can realize the objectives, including assertions that educa-
tion is the key to AIDS prevention, that public health must be 
protected, that human rights must be respected, and that discrim-
ination must be prevented.71 
WHO has directly addressed the social aspects of AIDS pre-
vention and control in its publications.72 WHO's literature states 
that no public health rationale justifies quarantine or any discrim-
inatory measures based solely on the fact that a person is known 
to be HIV -infected. 73 WHO further asserts that "persons sus-
pected or known to be HIV -infected should remain integrated 
within society to the maximum possible extent. ... "74 Thus, WHO 
strongly discourages the methods used by Cuba to prevent the 
spread of AIDS. 
Dr. Jonathan M. Mann, former Director of WHO's Global Pro-
gram on AIDS, has advanced at least two reasons why AIDS-
infected people should remain in society.75 First, the AIDS virus 
is not dangerous, provided society is educated about the means 
of transmission. 76 Second, the threat of quarantine will drive the 
problem "underground," effectively thwarting testing strategies 
and educational efforts. 77 
In 1987, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution com-
mending WHO for its efforts toward global AIDS prevention 
and control.78 Moreover, the resolution confirms that WHO 
should direct and coordinate the global battle against AIDS and 
70 Mann et aI., supra note 5, at 20. 
71 /d. at 21. 
72 See GUIDELINES FOR NURSING, supra note 5, at 41-42. See generally WORLD HEALTH 
ORGANIZATION, AIDS PREVENTION AND CONTROL (1988). 
73 GUIDELINES FOR NURSING, supra note 5, at 41. 
74 Id. at 42. 
75 See Jonathan M. Mann, A Global Strategy for a Global Challenge, WORLD HEALTH, Mar. 
1988, at 4. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 See Prevention and control of acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), G.A. Res. 421 
8, U.N. GAOR, 42d Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 19, U.N. Doc. A/42/49 (1987) [hereinafter 
Resolution]. The Resolution recognizes the "established leadership and the essential global 
directing and coordinating role of ... [WHO] in AIDS prevention, control and education 
.... " Id. 
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it commends those governments whose AIDS programs are in 
harmony with WHO's strategy.79 The General Assembly reaf-
firmed in 1988 and 1989 "the established leadership and the 
essential role of ... [WHO] in the global direction and coordi-
nation of AIDS prevention .... "80 Statements from various 
international assemblies also support WHO's efforts.81 
The international support shown for WHO's strategy has led 
some commentators to argue that the strategy amounts to a re-
quirement under international human rights law.82 This is a ten-
uous assertion, however, considering that many of the countries 
supporting the General Assembly resolution have adopted the 
same preventative measures WHO discourages.83 As indicated 
above, General Assembly resolutions may impose on U.N. mem-
bers an "obligation to take [the resolution] into consideration."84 
Such resolutions, however, would not bind states to introduce 
specific legislation even if they had voted for the resolution. This 
is not to say that the position concerning quarantine expressed 
by WHO is without significance. It is simply not the sole approach 
to AIDS prevention consistent with international human rights. 
C. Individual State Considerations 
A fundamental concern expressed in WHO's AIDS program 
is that states should protect human rights and preserve the dignity 
of those who have the disease.85 Almost all states would agree 
that these goals are of prime importance.86 Deciding how best to 
achieve them is another matter. As Maria Paalman, Director of 
the Dutch Foundation for STD Control, has written, "[o]ne global 
79 Id. 
80 See Mann et aI., supra note 5, at 22. 
81 See id. at 20. The strategy has been approved and adopted by the World Health 
Assembly (May 1987), the Venice Summit of the Heads of State of Government (June 
1987), the Economic and Social Council ofthe United Nations (July 1987) and the World 
Summit of Ministers of Health on Programmes for AIDS Prevention (London, Jan. 1988). 
82 See, e.g., Kirby, supra note 6, at 48. 
83 See Michael Micklin & David F. Sly, International Population Movements and AIDS: 
Patterns, Consequences, and Policy Implications, in THE GLOBAL IMPACT OF AIDS 67,76 (Alan 
F. Fleming et al. eds., 1988) (pointing out the large number of countries which have some 
form of mandatory AIDS screening contrary to WHO's policy recommendations). See also 
Jarvis, supra note 41, at 1009-11. 
84 See Delupis, supra note 47, at 52. 
85 See Mann et aI., supra note 5, at 21. 
86 See generally Resolution, supra note 78. 
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strategy for AIDS prevention is neither possible nor desirable."87 
Common sense dictates that there is a need to consider state-
specific factors when designing a prevention strategy.88 Thus, 
determining whether Cuba's quarantine policy is consistent with 
international human rights law requires viewing it not only in 
light of WHO's guidelines, but against factors particular to Cuba. 
These factors include Cuba's political structure and principles, its 
educational and cultural environment, the prevalence of the HIV 
virus, and the strengths and weaknesses of Cuba's national health 
care system.89 
Examination of Cuba's quarantine program in light of the 
above factors permits testing of the premises behind the assertion 
that no public health rationale exists to justify the policy.90 If, for 
example, most Cubans would not heed warnings of infection even 
if informed, then one of the underlying reasons for WHO's strat-
egy is lost.91 Studying the performance of the Cuban education 
system and its impact on Cuban society should help determine 
whether AIDS can be successfully fought through education. In 
essence, analyzing Cuba's quarantine policy in this manner will 
provide a means by which to determine whether the detention is 
arbitrary.92 
87 Paalman, supra note 10, at 218. See also Robert J. Earickson, International Behavioral 
Responses to a Health Hazard: AIDS, 31 Soc. SCI. & MED. 960 (1990). 
88 See Earickson, supra note 87, at 960. Earickson states: "Differences have been doc-
umented in individual responses to natural hazards in developing and developed coun-
tries. Similarly, there are different cultural responses to AIDS in these nations." Id. 
89 The factors selected do not exhaust the possibilities. Nevertheless, they represent 
factors likely to influence the effectiveness of the AIDS prevention program employed. 
90 See Mann, supra note 75, at 4. 
91 Id. Some individuals will fail to act responsibly even if they know the risks. See, e.g., 
infra note 147 and accompanying text. Failure to reach a few individuals through edu-
cation does not, however, make reliance on education as a means of preventing AIDS 
unsound. Yet, if the number of individuals ignoring the message becomes significant, 
then it would be irresponsible to continue making education the sole element of the anti-
AIDS strategy. 
92 In its treatment of article 9 of the Universal Declaration, the American Law Institute 
offers a definition of arbitrary, but only as it pertains to the detention of alleged criminals. 
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, at § 702 cmt. h. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights 
has also studied the concept of arbitrary detention, but its study is also largely concerned 
with criminal detention. See generally UNITED NATIONS, STUDY OF THE RIGHT OF EVERYONE 
TO BE FREE FROM ARBITRARY ARREST, DETENTION AND EXILE, 1964 [hereinafter STUDY]. The 
study only briefly discusses detention of persons afflicted with infectious diseases, con-
cluding that detainees must be treated with dignity. Id. at 182. Thus, for the purposes of 
this Comment, an arbitrary health policy will be defined as one that will not work, or if 
it does work, is more restrictive or harsh than is necessary. 
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III. CUBA'S QUARANTINE 
Prior to 1986, Cuba had no program designed to address the 
AIDS crisis.93 In fact, Cuban authorities thought of AIDS as a 
"Western" disease, the result of decadent behavior.94 By mid-
1986, however, Cuban authorities began to formulate a concerted 
plan of action against the AIDS problem.95 Part of the program 
is designed to educate the public about the dangers of AIDS, but 
it is not the crux of the strategy.96 
By early 1987, the Cubans made the focus of their strategy 
known. The government announced that it would test Cuba's 
entire population.97 Consequently, all Cubans returning from vis-
its abroad, all Cubans admitted to any hospital for any reason, 
and all Cubans likely to have contact with foreigners are tested 
for HIV infection.98 In addition to testing its own population, 
the government requires foreigners planning to stay in the coun-
try for more than three months to have a blood test upon entering 
Cuba.99 The government does not, however, plan to test vaca-
tioning tourists who enter the country.IOO 
As with other public health campaigns in Cuba, these efforts 
enlist the help of "mass organizations" such as the Committees 
for the Defense of the Revolution, the Women's Federation, and 
various trade unions.101 Cuban officials state that it is unnecessary 
to test people through coercion because all Cubans come into 
contact with the medical system, whether through the workplace, 
at school, or for medical treatment. 102 Additionally, informed 
consent is not required. According to Dr. Hector Terry, Cuban 
95 See Nick Caistor, Treatment for Life, NEW SCIENTIST, Feb. 18, 1989, at 65; Anne 
McElvoy, Soldiers of Misfonune, THE TIMES (London), Nov. 10, 1989, at 14E. 
94 See OFFICE OF RESEARCH & POLICY RADIO MARTI PROGRAM, CUBA ANNUAL REpORT: 
1986481 (1990) [hereinafter RADIO MARTI]. 
95 Caistor, supra note 93, at 65. 
96 See Ronald Bayer & Cheryl Healton, Controlling AIDS in Cuba, 320 NEW ENG. J. OF 
MED. 1022, 1022 (1989). 
97 See Treaster, supra note 1, at A2. 
98 See N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1989, at E24, col. 5; Bayer & Healton, supra note 96, at 
1022. 
99 Caistor, supra note 93, at 65. 
100 Eliseo J. Perez-Stable, Cuba's Response to the HIV Epidemic, AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH, 
May, 1991, at 565. 
lOl See Bayer & Healton, supra note 96, at 1022. These organizations are called upon 
to help perform various non-specialized functions, such as compiling lists of persons who 
have served outside of Cuba since 1975. 
102 /d. at 1022-23. 
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Vice-Minister of Health,103 "[p]hysicians undertake the tests that 
they consider crucial. It is not for patients to make such deter-
minations."104 
The Cuban government uses a variety of testing methods sim-
ilar to or the same as those used by other countries. 105 Despite 
the medical system's best efforts, however, both false positive and 
false negative readings are possibilities.106 The consequence of a 
false positive, if authorities do not later discover the error, is 
quarantine. 107 
Once AIDS carriers are identified, cases come under the juris-
diction of the Ministry of the Interior. lOs Anyone who tests HIV 
positive is "asked" to move to Finca Los Cocos, a former planta-
tion and sanitarium outside of Havana. 109 Some reports indicate 
that those who refuse to go are brought by force, although this 
has not been confirmed by any human rights organizations. llo 
According to Rodolfo Rodriguez, head of the AIDS testing pro-
gram, doctors and nurses are sent to convince AIDS carriers that 
"it is better to go .... " III While he denies that force or coercion 
is used, the fact that everyone depends on the state for their 
livelihood is likely to induce cooperation. 112 
Given the controlled nature of Cuban society, it is difficult to 
determine effectively the nature of the care AIDS patients re-
103 /d. at 1023. 
104 [d. 
105 Id. 
106 [d. See also Perez-Stable, supra note 100, at 564. Cuba's testing program identifies 
AIDS carriers through the use of domestically developed enzyme-linked immonosorbent 
assay (ELISA), Western blot assay, and antigen tests. The Cuban tests meet international 
standards, according to Cuban authorities. Nevertheless, even if the tests meet interna-
tional standards and stringent laboratory procedures are maintained, approximately one 
in every 135,000 persons will, at least initially, receive a false positive test result. 
107 Perez-Stable, supra note 100, at 565. Cuban authorities are aware of the possibility 
of false positive and negative results. To guard against internment of uninfected persons, 
multiple screening tests are conducted on individuals who test positive. It is impossible to 
know, however, how carefully the tests are performed. 
lOB See Betancourt, supra note 6, at 2. 
109 Caistor, supra note 93, at 65. 
110 See Bayer & Healton, supra note 96, at 1024; Betancourt, supra note 6, at 2; infra 
note 123 and accompanying text. 
III Caistor, supra note 93, at 65. 
112 [d. On the other hand, the Cuban people, including those who are often critical of 
the government, seem to accept the quarantine policy, and patients may indeed believe it 
is best to separate themselves from society. See Perez-Stable, supra note 100, at 566. 
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ceive. ll3 A number of U.S. health professionals have visited Los 
Cocos, however, and report that living conditions, by Cuban stan-
dards, appear clean and humane. 114 Patients questioned generally 
spoke as though they were willingly cooperating with the author-
ities, although they made their statements in the presence of 
sanitarium staff members.115 A doctor at the sanitarium said that 
the patients receive the wages they did previous to their intern-
ment. 116 The authorities allow visits to local shops in the company 
of an attendant, and patients with families can visit them for up 
to five days, again with a chaperone, if they sign a promise to 
abstain from any sexual relations. ll7 The Cuban doctor also said 
that the staff provides both medical treatment and psychological 
counseling to the patients. I IS 
With no cure for AIDS in sight, Cuba's isolation of AIDS 
carriers is indefinite. llg Naturally, this has resulted in escape at-
tempts, reportedly leading to massive man-hunts. 12o Dr. Terry 
stated that there had been escapes from the sanitarium, but that 
the fugitives returned after recognizing their need for care at the 
center. 121 Other sources report that the treatment of escapees is 
harsh, and includes imprisonment. 122 Again, independent human 
rights organizations have been unable to confirm the allega-
tions. 123 
113 Foreigners who were allowed to visit Los Cocos were accompanied by authorities. 
See Bayer & Healton, supra note 96, at 1023-24. Nevertheless, considering the world-wide 
attention AIDS is receiving and the desire of the Cuban government to present its medical 
system in the best possible light, it is doubtful that the government would allow the 
patients to be mistreated. See infra note 172 and accompanying text. 
114 See Betancourt, supra note 6; Bayer & Healton, supra note 96, at 102; N.Y. TIMES, 
supra note 98, at £24, col. 5. The officials who visited Cuba include two medical doctors 
and two public health specialists from Columbia University. 
115 See Bayer & Healton, supra note 96, at 1023. 
116 Caistor, supra note 93, at 65. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 "Indefinite" does not necessarily mean "until a cure is found." Cuban authorities 
are exploring the possibility of allowing individuals to return to their families in certain 
cases. See Bayer & Healton, supra note 96, at 1024; Perez-Stable, supra note 100, at 566. 
See also infra note 183 and accompanying text. 
120 See Betancourt, supra note 6, at 2; Bayer & Healton, supra note 96, at 1024. 
121 See Bayer & Healton, supra note 96, at 1024. 
122 Betancourt, supra note 6, at 2. 
123 Bayer & Healton, supra note 96, at 2. Americas Watch, a human rights group 
concerned about Cuban prison conditions, has been unable to substantiate the allegations. 
Telephone Interview with Mary-Jane Camejo, Americas Watch (Oct. 8, 1991). 
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IV. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE CHOICE OF STRATEGY: Is THE 
DETENTION ARBITRARY? 
A. The Political System and Ideology 
Cuba's political system is decidedly Marxist-Leninist. 124 As such, 
individual rights are subservient to the needs of the state. 125 While 
this does not eliminate individual rights, it does mean that collec-
tive interests weigh heavily in the event that the two require 
balancing. 126 
Marxist-Leninist ideology makes government actions relatively 
easy to justify on grounds of the "collective good." This, in turn, 
makes individual human rights violations difficult, though not 
impossible, to establish in Communist countries. 127 Cuba is known 
to have perpetrated human rights abuses on individuals in the 
name of state interests. 128 The concern about Cuba's quarantine 
policy is that the government is using the "public good" to justify 
what is actually an arbitrary detention. 
Critics of the quarantine policy may point to past oppressive 
treatment of homosexuals as proof that the Cuban government 
is using public health and safety as a pretense for continued 
persecution. In the early 1970s, the government began a cam-
paign designed to eliminate homosexuality because it represented 
Western decadence and was, therefore, counter-revolutionary.129 
Homosexuals were "arrested in the streets, seized from their 
homes, and sent to reeducation camps."130 While the repression 
lasted only two years, the attitudes reflected in the policy may 
still be held by members of government, if not society as a 
whole. 131 
124 See THOMAS ET AL., supra note 65, at 48. 
125 Id. 
126 See Bayer & Healton, supra note 96, at 1024. In the context of AIDS prevention, 
this philosophy favors public health over individual freedom. 
127 See, e.g., Rosalyn Higgins, Conceptual Thinking About the Individual in International 
Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 476,486-87 (R. Falk et al. 
eds., 1985) (referring to the Soviet Union's use of an order public caveat in the ICCPR to 
justify strict emigration restrictions). 
128 See THOMAS ET AL., supra note 65, at 48-49 (discussing political prisoners who are 
classified as "counterrevolutionaries"); infra note 129 and accompanying text. 
129 THOMAS ET AL., supra note 65, at 48-49. See JACOBO TIMERMAN, CUBA: A JOURNEY 
57 (1990). Timerman states: "The problem of homosexuals was always linked in revolu-
tionary morality and political analysis to the relations existing between prostitution and 
corruption as controlled by the U.S. East Coast Mafia." TIMMERMAN, supra, at 57. 
180 TIMERMAN, supra note 129, at 58. 
mId. 
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This might be a powerful argument except for the fact that 
the majority of all internees are not homosexual. 132 Educational 
pamphlets and materials distributed by the government "stress 
that AIDS is not a disease exclusively of homosexuals and can 
affect any person."133 Additionally, initial government claims that 
AIDS is a "Western" disease have ceased. 134 
B. Education and Culture 
At first glance, Cuba would appear to have the very kind of 
education system needed for an effective fight against AIDS.135 
Cuba has reportedly excelled in education. 136 In 1961, the gov-
ernment stunned the world when it announced a reduction in 
illiteracy to just 4 percent from a rate of 25 percent in 1957. 137 
In the 1958-1959 school year there were 17,355 teachers in Cuba. 
Ten years later the number had risen to 47,876. The number of 
primary school students jumped from 700,000 to 1.4 million 
during the same period. Despite these achievements, however, 
there are serious problems with the system. 
While school enrollment during the 1960s increased dramati-
cally, in the 1970s over 70 percent of elementary and 85 percent 
of high school age students dropped out of school. 138 There is a 
lack of teaching materials, graduation requirements are substan-
dard, and behavioral problems are extensive. 139 Academic fraud 
and cheating is widespread, involving both students and teach-
ers.140 Frustration with the education system is expressed at the 
highest levels of government. 141 
IS2 See Bayer & Healton, supra note 96, at 1023. Authorities stated that approximately 
one-third of the 171 male residents at Los Cocos were homosexual or bisexual. 
us [d. at 1022. 
1S4 See Betancourt, supra note 6, at 2. 
IS5 Given Cuba's 94 percent literacy rate, dissemination of AIDS information should 
not be a problem. For a comparison of Cuba's literacy rate with that of other Latin 
American countries, see SANDOR HALEBSKY & JOHN M. KIRK, TRANSFORMATION AND 
STRUGGLE: CUBA FACES THE 1990s 144 (1990). 
IS6 See THOMAS ET AL., supra note 65, at 42. 
IS7 [d. at 41. 
IS8 [d. at 51. 
IS9 See RADIO MARTI, supra note 94, at lOS. 
140 THOMAS ET AL., supra note 65, at 42. According to official sources, 34 percent of all 
secondary schools were involved in fraud or cheating. 
141 See RADIO MARTI, supra note 94, at lOS. Castro himself has described the shortcom-
ings of the Cuban system: "The quality of our education still leaves much to be desired. 
Some classes are still mediocre or poor; notes rather than textbooks, are often relied upon 
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Adding to this frustration may be the Cuban government's 
inability to re-shape "unhealthy" Cuban societal and cultural prac-
tices through "re-education" campaigns. 142 One of these cam-
paigns was aimed at reducing or eliminating prostitution in 
Cuba. 143 Despite extensive government efforts, prostitution re-
mains prevalent. 144 
The failure of the Cuban education system may have contrib-
uted significantly to the government's decision to employ quar-
antine as the primary means of controlling AIDS. The govern-
ment simply has no faith in the ability of its educational system 
to change undesirable behavior.145 Cuba is concerned that even 
those who know they have the disease might not alter their be-
havior.146 Considering that such irresponsibility is not uncommon, 
their concern is not unfounded. 147 
On the other hand, Cubans arguably might respond differently 
if confronted with a sexually transmitted disease that causes 
death. As indicated above, however, Cubans are frustrated with 
and unresponsive to their educational system. 148 While the gov-
ernment is reluctant to acknowledge the possibility, it may fear 
.... Problems persist in the cultivation of proper social conduct, even in the case of 
teachers as [with] some young people." [d. 
142 See TIMERMAN, supra note 129, at 57. 
14' [d. at 92. 
144 [d. Timerman, who traveled extensively throughout Cuba with the government's 
permission, writes: "I don't understand why Castroism insists that the Revolution has 
eliminated prostitution through a reeducation campaign .... In Cuba you encounter 
prostitutes everywhere." [d. See also MAX AZICRI, CUBA: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIETY 
161-62 (1988). 
145 See Bayer & Healton, supra note 96, at 1024; TIMERMAN, supra note 129, at 88. 
Timerman states that while government ideology has altered many elements of Cuban 
culture, "[t]he Revolution could do nothing to steer or rechannel the energy which Cubans 
assign to eroticism." TIMERMAN, supra note 129, at 88. See also Perez-Stable, supra note 
100, at 564. The Interior Ministry's greatest concern is "that of irresponsible sexual 
behavior among men characterized by the machismo cultural trait who are likely to seek 
extramarital sexual partners." Perez-Stable, supra note 100, at 564. 
146 See Caistor, supra note 93, at 65. This is amply illustrated by Cuba's use of chaperones 
and written promises to abstain from sexual relations whenever AIDS patients leave Los 
Cocos. 
147 See Earickson, supra note 87, at 957. Earickson states: "It is clear that some people 
are reluctant to alter their behavior even when damage to property or a threat to life is 
at stake." [d. The number of documented cases of informed AIDS carriers behaving 
irresponsibly is not insignificant. For a brief discussion of international reaction to such 
cases, see Robert M. Jarvis, AIDS: A Global View, 12 NOVA L. REv. 979, 1007-08 (1988). 
148 See supra text accompanying notes 138-41. 
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that society will perceive its warnings concerning AIDS as nothing 
more than Revolutionary rhetoric. 149 
Given the failure of the Cuban education system to curb un-
desirable and risky social behavior,150 it seems inappropriate to 
fault the government for having little faith in education as a 
means to prevent the spread of AIDS. Nevertheless, even if ed-
ucation efforts would not effectively halt the spread of AIDS in 
Cuba, questions surrounding the efficacy of its quarantine re-
main. 151 
C. The Prevalence of AIDS and the Health System's Capabilities 
Critics argue that quarantine is ineffective because people will 
avoid testing out of fear. 152 They also argue that mandatory test-
ing will not guarantee prevention of the spread of the disease for 
two reasons. First, they argue that transmission may occur after 
testing, and second, that the tests may yield false negative read-
ings. Finally, they claim that the costs of quarantine will be pro-
hibitive. 153 These blanket predictions are unconvincing. Cuba's 
method of coping with the medical challenge of AIDS must be 
analyzed in light of the prevalence of the disease and the capa-
bilities of its medical system. 
The prevalence of the AIDS virus in Cuba is difficult to mea-
sure because only tightly controlled government statistics are 
available. 154 The government asserts that it has completed man-
datory testing of more than 90 percent of its 10.4 million citi-
zens. 155 Over 400 Cubans have tested HIV positive,156 and as of 
December 31, 1990, seventy-three Cubans had contracted 
AIDS.157 The number of AIDS cases per capita is far lower than 
the figures reported by other Caribbean nations, a fact the Cu-
149 See THOMAS ET AL., supra note 65, at 51. 
150 See supra notes 141, 145 and accompanying text. 
151 See infra text accompanying notes 152-53. 
152 See Mann, supra note 75, at 4. 
153 Mass HIV testing costs the Cuban government about $2 million per year. Perez-
Stable, supra note 100, at 564. 
154 See Treaster, supra note I, at A2. See also infra note 158 and accompanying text. 
155 See McElvoy, supra note 93, at 14E. 
156 See Perez-Stable, supra note 100, at 563. 
157 See World Health Organization, WEEKLY EPIDEMIOLOGICAL RECORD,July 5,1991, at 
198. 
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bans attribute to their health care system generally and, specifi-
cally, their quarantine policy.15S 
The Cuban government is said to have made extraordinary 
gains in health care since Fidel Casto seized power in 1959. 159 
The health care system is extensive and still growing. By the year 
2000, Cuba plans to have one doctor per 173 inhabitants, the 
highest ratio of doctors per capita in the world. 160 Cuba recently 
instituted a new family physician program which places a general 
practitioner and nurse in offices located on every city block and 
in every rural neighborhood. 161 In addition to creating an exten-
sive medical system, utilizing the most advanced medical tech-
nology is a priority in Cuba. The government is allocating re-
sources to such activities as genetic engineering, basic biological 
research, and specialized training in advanced diagnostic and 
research techniques. 162 The government expects accomplish-
ments in these areas to reinforce the image of a Cuba so advanced 
that it can provide excellent medical care to its entire po pula-
tion. 163 
Although the government is promoting Cuba as a major med-
ical power, it is failing to meet some of its society'S basic health 
needs. 164 The quality of health care is affected by the unavaila-
bility of even basic medical supplies, the poor maintenance of 
equipment, and the substandard hygienic conditions existing in 
some facilities. 165 
Such conditions reveal the underlying fragility of the Cuban 
medical system. A large scale outbreak of AIDS, such as that 
experienced by other Carribean nations, could strip Cuba of the 
resources needed to preserve its medical achievements and ad-
158 [d.; See also THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 688-716 (1990). Cuba has 
acknowledged 73 AIDS cases in a population of 10.4 million. By comparison, the Domin-
ican Republic has 1,506 cases in a population of 7.2 million; Haiti has 3,086 cases in a 
population of 6.4 million; and Jamaica has 201 cases in a population of 2.5 million. Some 
Cuban observers have questioned the accuracy of the Cuban government's figures. See 
Antonio M. Gordon & Reinaldo Paya, Controlling AIDS in Cuba, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
829 (1989). The Pan American Health Organization has, however, confirmed the govern-
ment's accuracy in reporting on other diseases. Some view this as evidence that the 
government is honest in reporting AIDS cases. See Perez-Stable, supra note 100, at 564. 
159 See Bayer & Healton, supra note 96, at 1022; THOMAS ET AL., supra note 65, at 44. 
160 See RADIO MARTI, supra note 94, at 263. 
161 See HALEBSKY & KIRK, supra note 135, at 253. 
162 See id. at 257, 260. 
16g See RADIO MARTI, supra note 94, at 616. 
164 [d. at 107. See also TIMERMAN, supra note 129, at 117. 
165 See RADIO MARTI, supra note 94, at 107. 
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dress its failures. 166 The Cuban government has, therefore, at-
tacked the threat of AIDS through methods that the medical 
system can handle without undue strain. 167 
The mandatory testing program is relatively inexpensive and 
easy.168 While Cuban officials recognize that some individuals will 
try to avoid testing, the highly controlled nature of the society 
makes avoidance difficult. 169 There is every indication that the 
Cuban health care system can effectively account for all of its 
citizens. 17o While the system is in a state of material disrepair, it 
is still extensive. 171 High level attention and support for the pro-
gram is virtually guaranteed by the high profile nature of the 
disease and the government's desire to be a "medical power."172 
Moreover, because it is an island, the government can easily limit 
unmonitored travel in and out of the country.173 
Cuban health officials are presumably aware of the possibility 
of infection after testing and false negative readings. 174 Whether 
they plan to periodically re-test the population is uncertain. 175 
There is strong consensus among health care experts that man-
datory testing must continue for the program to work. 176 Given 
166 The costs of AIDS are high. In the United States the costs of health care and lost 
income were estimated at over $6 billion for the first 10,000 cases. See John C. Moskop, 
Restrictive Public Health Measures and AIDS: An Ethical Analysis, in THE MEANING OF AIDS 
119, 119 (Eric T. J uengst & Barbara A. Koenig eds., 1989). 
167 See infra note 168 and accompanying text. 
168 A routine HIV antibody screening test costs about $6.00 in the United States. See 
Lorraine Day, What the Government Doesn't Tell You About AIDS, NEW DIMENSIONS, Feb: 
1991, at 75. In Cuba, however, voluntary help received from various "mass organizations" 
such as the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution probably reduce the cost 
significantly. See Bayer & Healton, supra note 96, at 1022. 
169 See THOMAS ET AL., supra note 65, at 48-49. 
170 See Bayer & Healton, supra note 96, at 1022. 
171 See HALEBSKY & KIRK, supra note 135, at 253. 
172 See RADIO MARTI, supra note 94, at 616. Cuba uses its medical accomplishments to 
try to reinforce its image as a country which takes a rigorous scientific approach toward 
public health. 
173 The fact that Cuba is an island is an important factor lending credibility to the 
mandatory testing program. If persons infected with AIDS were able to enter the country 
by land-that is, relatively easily-the effectiveness of the mandatory testing program 
would be significantly degraded. 
174 See Day, supra note 168, at 76. A person may test negative for months or sometimes 
years after becoming infected. 
175 Cuban officials are aware that false negative readings occur, but they have not 
indicated how they plan to deal with the problem. See Bayer & Healton, supra note 96, at 
1023. 
176 See Caistor, supra note 93, at 65; Bayer & Healton, supra note 96, at 1024. 
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that the apparatus is in place, it is hard to believe that the gov-
ernment would leave the task half finished. 177 
The monetary costs of quarantine are not prohibitively high. 
If the number of AIDS patients remains low, the government will 
be able to finance the cost of housing and medical care without 
excessive strain. 17S Moreover, the government would probably 
argue that by taking action now it is saving itself enormous finan-
cial outlays in the future. 179 Ultimately, there is no decisive way 
to determine how much money is saved or lost through quaran-
tine. It is notable, however, that most observers admit that the 
Cuban policy to date has significantly reduced the threat of an 
epidemic. ISO 
D. Less Restrictive Measures 
It is arguable that less restrictive measures than strict quaran-
tine could effectively stop the spread of AIDS. One suggested 
alternative to quarantine involved placing a discreet tattoo on the 
AIDS carrier to alert potential partners of the carrier's infec-
tion. lsl Certainly, there are moral and ethical problems with such 
a measure. Additionally, it would not be difficult for a carrier to 
hide the tattoo, especially considering the circumstances under 
which many sexual encounters take place. ls2 
Another less restrictive measure might be quarantine of only 
those carriers who knowingly engage in risky sexual behavior.ls3 
The risks inherent in this option, however, are unacceptably high 
177 The Cuban government is not impervious to criticism. See infra note 188 and 
accompanying text. In light of the embarrassment that failure of the policy would bring, 
it is unlikely that the authorities will disregard the need for re-testing. See supra note 172 
and accompanying text. 
178 See supra note 153 and accompanying text. Housing and medical care are socialized, 
thus the quarantine itself probably adds little to the overall budget. The government will 
lose money, however, by paying salaries to the interned if they are not employed in some 
capacity. On the other hand, jobs within the compound could defray these costs. 
179 See Pramilla Senanayake & Anthony Klonda, AIDS and Family Planning Programs, in 
THE GLOBAL IMPACT OF AIDS 107, 115 (1988). The costs of medical treatment for patients 
is proportionally higher in developing countries than it is in developed countries. 
180 Bayer & Healton, supra note 96, at 1024. 
181 See William F. Buckley, Crucial steps in combatting the AIDS epidemic: Identify all the 
carriers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1986, at A27. 
182 For other criticisms of this suggestion, see Moskop, supra note 166, at 126. 
183 See Jarvis, supra note 147, at 1007-09. 
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to the Cuban government. 184 Halting the spread of the disease 
would not be possible until carriers are identified. Considering 
the prevalence and acceptance of prostitution in Cuba, the time 
required to identify carriers could render the policy ineffective. 185 
Thus, alternative policies are unlikely to be as successful as the 
current policy.186 
E. Continuing Efforts 
Potential for success of the quarantine policy does not negate 
concern for the welfare of those interned. International human 
rights law requires respect for their dignity.187 By providing hu-
mane living conditions and health care for the interned, the 
Cuban government is fulfilling this responsibility.188 
There are problems with the Cuban program, for example, the 
government's decision not to test tourists. Unless recurrent testing 
is conducted in those areas that tourists frequent, quarantine 
could be rendered ineffective and, thus, arbitrary. It remains to 
be seen how the government will address this problem. 
Despite such concerns, the Cuban quarantine policy does not 
appear, at this time, to constitute an arbitrary detention. Whether 
the policy remains legitimate depends on future decision-making. 
The government must maintain humane treatment of AIDS pa-
tients. It must continue to test the general population and con-
tinue to explore less draconian alternatives. Finally, it must en-
sure, through multiple tests, that no one who is uninfected is 
mistakenly interned. 
184 See Bayer & Healton, supra note 96, at 1024. The justification for quarantine 
"assumes that since it is impossible to determine which infected persons can be trusted to 
behave in a responsible way sexually, they all have to be restricted and treated as a 
hazard." !d. 
185 See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
186 This does not mean that variations of a strict quarantine cannot be explored. See 
Bayer & Healton, supra note 96, at 1024. For example, if after observation and counseling 
at Los Cocos, doctors determine that a patient would not engage in risky behavior, the 
patient should be allowed to live at home. Cuban authorities say they are exploring such 
possibilities. 
187 See Stuyt, supra note 12, at 169; STUDY, supra note 92, at 182. 
188 See Caistor, supra note 93, at 65; Bayer & Healton, supra note 96, at 1024. Cuban 
authorities are well aware of the criticism their policy has provoked. They insist that they 
are exploring less extreme measures, but that for the present they have chosen the best 
course. 
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CONCLUSION 
Cuba's response to the AIDS epidemic warrants strict scrutiny. 
As implemented to date, however, it is not a violation of inter-
national human rights law. The strong potential for rapid spread 
of the disease, the likelihood that educational efforts will be ig-
nored, the policy's likely success, and the overall humane treat-
ment carriers receive are factors which, taken together, legitimize 
the detention. Certainly quarantine would not work and would 
thus be arbitrary if employed in most nations. Cuba presents a 
unique situation, however, which for now, justifies its unique 
approach to the AIDS crisis. 
David W. Johnston 
